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Voting and Power in the Small Firm:
Alternatives to the One-Share, One-Vote Rule
Robert Goon and John L. Teall

The one-share, one-vote rule applicable to the governance o f most business firms
provides for proportional voting power which differs substantially from propor
tional shareholdings o f investors. This problem is particularly acute in small firms
where several (or many) shareholders may hold significant proportions o f shares.
This paper reviews well-known game theoretic algorithms (weighting or vote
assignment schemes) for the alignment of power with proportional sharehold
ings. It also provides a simple measure o f the “misalignment o f power from
proportional shareholdings” and discusses its applicadon in determining more
equitable vote reassignment schemes.

I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The one-share, one-vote system of corporate governance is intended to
provide a fair distribution of power among shareholders with diverse interests
and expectations. However, it can be shown rather easily that the one-share,
one-vote system provides a distribution of power that is significantly out of
proportion to the distribution of votes am ong shareholders (Dubey &
Shapley, 1978; Shapiro 8c Shapley, 1978; and Shapley & Shubik, 1954). This
is particularly true for many smaller companies where each of the individual
shareholders or partners may hold significant num bers of shares relative to
the total num ber outstanding. The distribution of power among investors is
particularly im portant in smaller companies for a num ber of reasons:
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1. Investors in small companies tend to m aintain less diversified portfo
lios. With m ore significant proportions o f their wealth at stake in a
particular firm, control and risk m anagem ent is of greater im portance
to these investors.
2. Small firms subject themselves to significant shifts in power due to
their need to raise capital as they grow. Prospective shareholders in
the firm will be sensitive to the possibility o f being exploited by
controlling shareholders. This potential for abuse may inhibit the
small firm ’s ability to raise capital and grow. The reassignm ent of
voting rights may be an excellent means to deal with this problem .
3. Given that smaller firms are likely to have several shareholders holding
significant proportions of the firm ’s stock, the power level of each
shareholder is likely to be of greater consequence.
4. Shareholders of small firms firequently form readily identifiable coa
litions affecting the power structure of the firm.
5. Small firms differ from larger firms in that their securities tend to be
less marketable and m ore closely held, rendering the distribution of
control and minority discounts difficult to evaluate by owners and
prospective purchasers.^ Frequently, valuations are m andated and
determ ined by court systems and tax authorities. D ant (1975) dis
cusses the increased willingness of the court system to recognize the
value of control when establishing minority discounts.
Small firms are particularly suitable for various schemes to deviate from
one-share, one-vote rules. In addition to the im portance of the distribution
of power to small firms discussed above, it is often easy to determ ine how
many shares are owned by an investor at a given point in time when shares
are transferred and which investors are most likely to vote as blocks.
The game theory literature provides substantial inform ation on the meas
urem ent of power (e.g, Milnor 8c Shapley, 1978; Owen, 1972; von Neumann
8c M orgenstern, 1944). These and other works have provided a foundation
for the m easurem ent and valuation of control in the business and finance
literature (Rydqvist, 1987; Robinson & White, 1989). The Shapley value and
its “oceanic” variations (for large firms) have been used most extensively in
the financial literature (Rydqvist, 1986,1987; Robinson &: W hite, 1989) and
there have been occasional references to the Banzhaf index (Rydqvist, 1986).
Each of these papers note the discrepancy between investor shareholdings
proportions and relative voting power levels. Ratner (1970) argues that the
one-share, one-vote rule gives excessive power to holders of large blocks,
resulting in significant misallocations of resources and redistributions of
wealth. Meeker and Joy (1980) and Meeker, Joy, and Cogger (1983) in their
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studies of closely held banks dem onstrate the im portance of voting and
control in the smaller, closely held firm.
The firm is regarded here as a set of contracts (the corporate charter,
bylaws, bond indentures, m anagerial contracts, etc.) characterizing th ejo in t
activities o f and the payoffs to the contracting parties (see Alchian &: Demsetz
1972; Fama, 1980; Jensen Sc Meckling, 1976). This contractual structure
specifies a wide range of the firm ’s activities. However, Easterbrook and
Fischel (1983) argue that it is impractical, cosdy, or impossible for this set of
contracts to fully prespecify all of the activities which may be necessary in
reaction to unknown future conditions. Thus, the im portance of the voting
mechanism is that it is intended to provide for “fair” reactions to varying
conditions on a timely basis. Presumably, the num ber of votes an investor
holds is a function of the value of his investment in the firm; therefore, his
voting power is based on the im portance of the election to him. Nonetheless,
the one-share, one vote rule provides for voting power which is not propor
tional to shareholdings (For example, consider the obvious case of two voters,
where one has 49 percent o f the votes). Voting reassignm ent schemes such
as those discussed in the next section have been applied in the political arena
(e.g.. New York State, certain county supervisorial boards) and m aybe applied
to the corporate arena. The small firm, with its readily identifiable controlling
factions represents an excellent arena for applications of voting reassignm ent
schemes.

n.

MEASUREMENT OF POWER

Consider the following example where a firm with 99 outstanding shares has
five shareholders (i) whose shareholdings (a;*) are given as follows:
I
A
B
C
D
E
Total

Wi
35
30
20
13
1
99

Assume th at a simple m ^ority vote will determ ine the outcome of a simple
corporate election (a = 50) with only two possible outcomes (y es/no). W hat
are the relative power levels of each participant in this corporate election?
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Although the answer to this is a function of exactly how power is m easured,
it will be clear th at power is n o t proportional to shareholdings. An investor
is said to have power if his vote may be pivotal in a corporate election o r if he
has the potential to “swing” the result o f the election. We m ight measure the
power of a participant in an election by determ ining the likelihood that an
investor will be pivotal or swing election results. The reader may notice
immediately that shareholders A, B, and C are capable of influencing election
results; shareholders D and E are not. Thus, despite their investments in the
firm, shareholders (or partners) D and E have no voting power in the
elections of the firm. Clearly, power is not proportional to shareholdings.
O ne of the earliest and simplest power indices is discussed in Shapley and
Shubik (1954) and Shapiro and Shapley (1978). The oceanic variation o f the
Shapley Index or Value discussed later has been by far the m ost influential
in the financial and economics literature. This index is based on an election
where n voters queue to vote in any one of n! equiprobable orders or
perm utations. The Shapley Power Index {Si) for a particular voter determines
the probability that his block of votes will be pivotal assuming that prior votes
in the queue are cast unanimously, in sequence, and that his position in that
sequence is random . Thus, this index determ ines the average marginal
contribution of voter Y to any voting coalition to which he m ight belong. A
coalition is defined here to be a subset of voters who cast identical votes. The
Shapley Index for voter Fis determ ined as follows:

q= \

where

^ Y^Q

n = the num ber of participants in the election;
q = the num ber of participants in coalition Q
v( 0 = the characteristic function or maximvrai potential worth of
coalition f t 1 if the coalition wins and 0 if it loses
V l'

c(0 =

ri

The maximum worth or characteristic function v(Q) o f a coalition Q
(com bination of voters voting identically) m ight be interpreted as the total
of its m em bers’ benefits of belonging to the coalition. If v(Q) o r v ( Q - {F})
are limited to values of either zero or one for the purpose o f m easm ing power,
the norm alized Shapley Value 5y/EjSiis regarded as the probability that voter
Y is pivotal. In this case, a coalition has a maximum worth v{ 0 of one if it
wins the election or zero if it loses. Using equation (1) (Results and compu
tations are summarized in Tables 1 and 2), we find that Shapley Values for
shareholders A, B and C are 1.733 and zero for shareholders D and E.
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Table 1
Pivotal Voters in 120 Potential Election Outcomes
ABCDE
ABDCE
ADBCE
DABCE
ABCED
ABDEC
ADBEC
DABEC
ABECD
ABEDC
ADEBC
DAEBC
AEBCD
AEBDC
AEDBC
DEABC
EABCD
EABDC
EADBC
EDABC

BACDE
BADGE
BDACE
DBACE
BACED
BADEC
BDAEC
DBAEC
B^CD
BAEDC
BDEAC
DBEAC
BEACD
BEADC
BEDAC
DEBAC
EBACD
EBADC
EBDAC
EDBAC

ACBDE
ACDBE
ADOBE
DACBE
ACBED
ACDEB
ADCEB
DACEB
ACEBD
ACEDB
ADECB
DAECB
AECBD
AECDB
AEDCB
DEACB
EACBD
EACDB
EADCB
EDACB

ACADE
BfiDAE
BDCAE
DBCAE
BCAED
BCDEA
BDCEA
DBCEA
BCEAD
BCEDA
BDECA
DBECA
BEGAD
BECDA
BEDCA
DERGA
EBCAD
EBCDA
EBDCA
EDBCA

G ^D E
G ^BE
G D^E
DGABE
GABED
GADEB
GDAEB
D G ^
GAEBD
G ^DB
GDEAB
DGE^
GEABD
G E^B
GEDAB
DEGAB
EGABD
EGADB
EGDAB
EDGAB

GBADE
GBDAE
GDBAE
DGBAE
GBAED
GBDEA
GDBEA
DGBEA
GBEAD
GBEDA
GDEBA
DGEBA
GEBAD
GEBDA
GEDBA
DEGBA
ECBAD
EGBDA
EGDBA
EDGBA

Note: The underlined shareholder is the pivotal voter for that particular permutation o f voters.

Table 2
Computing Shapley Values
Sa = l/5 -{ (l/l)-0 + (1 /4 )1 2 + (l/6)-16 + (l/4)-12 + (1/1)-0}=1.733
Sb = l/5 -{ (l/l)-0 + (1 /4 )1 2 + (1 /6 )4 6 + (1 /4 )1 2 + (1/1)-0}=1.733
Sc= l/5 -{ (l/l)-0 + (1 /4 )1 2 + (1 /6 )1 6 + (1 /4 )1 2 + (1/1)-0}=1.733

& = l/5 -{ (l/l)-0 + (1/4)-0 + (1/6)-0 + (1/4) 0 + (1/1)-0}= 0
^£-1/5-{(1/1)-0 + (1/4)-0+ (l/6 )-0 + (1/4)-0+ (1/1)0}= 0___________________________
Notes: There are 5!=120 permutations o f five voters from the example. Thus, there are (5-l)!= 24
permutations where a given shareholder votes in a given slot one through five. This table computes
the number o f times a particular voter will be pivotal given his position in the voting queue. For
example, if Voter A is third to cast his votes, he will be pivotal in 16 out o f 24 potential election
outcomes. He is pivotal only if either shareholder B or C (but not both) are ahead o f him in slots
one or two in the queue. Fifty votes out o f 99 are required for a favorable msgority.
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Normalized values are 1 /3 for each shareholder A, B and C; norm alized
Shapley Values are zero for Shareholders D and E. Shareholders A, B and C
have equal power; shareholders D and E have no power.
Banzhaf (1965) develops a second power index based on the probability
that the particular voter is a “swinger”. A voter is a “swinger” if he could change
the election result by changing his vote. The Banzhaf Index has the advantage
in the corporate setting over the Shapley Indices in th at it is based on
equiprobable voting coalitions or combinations (perhaps generating many
“swingers”, each of whom are capable of influencing the election result)
rather than equiprobable voting perm utations (orderings of voters where
only one voter in the “queue” can be pivotal). Thus, it is possible in a given
election for m ore than one voter to swing election results.
In a given election, n voters may form 2”^^ coalitions (including the null
set), half of which, or 2” are winning coalitions (assuming 0.5w votes are
required for a mzyority). The num ber of swings for a particular voter \lj{v) ,
equals the num ber of coalitions which require his participation to win. To
determ ine a voter’s relative power, one may com pute the norm alized Banzhaf
Power Index as follows:
j^N

where

|Xi<v) = the num ber of coalitions that require Voter Y to win
= the num ber of coalitions that require Voter ^ to win
N = the set of all voters

The Banzhaf Index permits multiple swingers in any given election
outcome. If an election outcome generates multiple swingers, increm ents to
their power indices are equally distributed. Dubey and Shapley (1978) suggest
that Banzhaf indices may be revised to reflect probabilities of a given voter
being a swinger:
By{v) = \y y {v )/2 ^ \

(3)

where n is the num ber of voters and 2'^^ is the num ber of potential coalitions
which may be formed. Table 3 provides an example of applying the Banzhaf
Index in the small firm.
Each of the indices discussed above has the advantage, particularly in the
regulatory and judicial arenas, of being “sociologically neutral” in that they
do n o t require assumptions regarding the election preferences o f any of the
contestants in the election. Each voting perm utation or com bination is
regarded as being equally likely to be realized. However, this sociological
neutrality may present some disadvantages in the applied corporate setting.
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Table 3
Swingers in 32 Potential Election Outcomes
Votersfor

A
B
C
D
E
M
A CD
A D
Notes:

Voters
against

Votersfar

BCDE
A CDE
AB DE
*ABC E
*ABCD
CDE
B DE
BC E

A
E
BC
B D
B E
CD
C E
DE
*ABC

Voters
against

BCD
A DE
A C E
A CD
AB E
M
E
*ABC
DE

Votersfor

Voters
against

AB D
AB E
A CD
A C E
A DE
BCD
BC E
B DE

C E
CD
B E
B D
BC
A
E
A D
A C

Votersfor

CDE
*ABCD
*ABC E
AB DE
A CDE
BCDE
*ABCDE

Voters
against

AB
E
D
C
B
A
*ABCDE

1. From the example.
2. Underlined voters are swingers in that potential outcome.
3. Shareholder A is a swinger in 16 o f 32 potential outcomes.
4. Shareholders B and C are each swingers in 16 potential outcomes.
5. Shareholders D and E are never swingers.
6. Raw Owen power indices are simply 0 /^ O b=O c - 2 /3 , and Ojy=OE= 0.
7. The sum o f power indices is two.
8. Normalized power indices are simply raw values divided by two.
9. Asterisks denote potential winning coalitions without A n gers.
10. Note that the total number o f coalitions = 64 = 26 = 2”^^

In many instances the m anager, raider or other contestant for control may
have known specific preferences regarding the outcome of an election.
Furtherm ore, one or m ore of his competitors for control may also have
indicated preferences or seem likely to form certain coalitions. These stated
or implied preferences may change the corporation’s balance of power
significandy. Hence, the corporate charter may provide for the application
of a power index which reflects contestants’ preferences or likelihoods of
joining particular coalitions or voting in a certain m anner.
Owen (1972) develops a power index which accounts for contestants’
preferences by assigning probabilities p i to each voter i of voting for the
proposal. Let N h e the set of all voters in a corporate election and T b e a
subset of voters who m ight form a coalition. The characteristic function
(maximum worth which is one for winning coalitions and zero for losing
coalitions) for coalition T is v{T). The maximum worth or characteristic
function t;( 7) of a coalition m ight be interpreted as the total of its m em bers’
benefits o f belonging to the coalition. Owen’s power index for voter Y is
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simply the sum of his contributions to all coalitions, each weighted for its
probability of being formed:

nM- n

Oy= ^
TeN\Y ieT

(4)

[l-p^ [v(T u Y )-viT )]

I

UT

where
N \ Y is the set of all voters, excluding voter Y;
\ { T u Y ) - v { T ) is voter F s contribution to coalition T;
pi is the probability that voter ^joins coalition T
If the characteristic function results in a value of one for a winning
coalition and zero for a losing coalition, then Or m ight be interpreted as the
probability that voter Fwill be a “swinger” on a winning coalition.
If shareholders are equally likely to form any coalition {pi = 0.5), Owen
power indices will be the same as Banzhaf indices. The relative strength of
the Owen index in m easuring power in the small firm is that it allows for
varying uncertainties with regard to form ation of coalitions. O ne may predict
in many firms that certain coalitions are m ore likely than others to form (for
example, am ong family m em bers). Such prespecified coalitions significantly
affect the distribution of power in the firm. Thus, one uses the Owen Index
when participants vary in their probabilities (j&i) in joining a given coalition
of voters.
In the example given above, Shapley, Banzhaf and Owen Power Indices
all have the same values. Voter shareholdings {wi), fractional holdings
power indices {P{, each index is the same for a given voter) and deviations
Table 4
Shareholdings, Power Indices and
Squared Differences

i

Wi

fi

A
35
0.354
B
30
0.303
C
20
0.202
D
13
0.131
E
1
0.010
Total
99
1.00
= St /5 = 0.0069906.
0 = 0.0836098
Note: Sr=TotalofA

Pi
0.53
0.33
0.33
0
0
1.00

^2
0.000576
0.000729
0.016384
0.017161
0.000100
0.034953

STmll Firm Voting and Power
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squared ^={fi~Pi)^ are given for each voter in Table 4. We compute the sum
of squared errors of differences between power index values and actual
shareholdings: = 0.0069906. The square root of this value, 0.0836, measures
the “error” or “m isalignm ent of power from proportional shareholdings” in
using the one-share, one-vote rule rather than a power index to assign votes.
O ur objective will be to determ ine how to minimize this error, so as to
minimize the discrepancy between a voter’s shareholdings and his power.

m . ESTABUSHING A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF
POWER
Shapley, Banzhaf, and Owen Power Indices all indicated that shareholders
A, B and C share equally the power in the firm (assuming either that all
perm utations or combinations of shareholders are equiprobable), though
their shareholdings are far from equal. Shareholder D has no power, even
though his holdings are signrficandy larger than those of shareholder E and
65 percent as large of those of Shareholder C. In addition to being regarded
cis unfair, inequitable distributions of corporate power may lead to inequita
ble distributions o f corporate cash flows and suboptimal investment and
financing policy. A variety of measures may be employed to distribute power
more equitably am ong shareholders. Included among these m ight be to:
1. Assign voting power among shareholders such that the power index
of each is proportional to the num ber of shares that he holds.
2. Combine issues to be voted such that shareholders may spread their
votes among issues based on their relative importance. This provides
for what is typically term ed a cumulative voting process.
3. Establish super-mjyority voting requirem ents for certain issues.
Cumulative voting processes are already well established in corporate
charters in most states. However, this process is useful only if there is m ore
than one issue of relatively equal im portance to be determ ined in one
election. The selection of a series of board members is an obvious example
of such a situation. Many corporate issues such as proposed mergers and
proposed am endm ents to corporate charters are not likely to be combined
with other issues of comparable im portance on a given election slate. Cumu
lative voting differs from simple m ^ority voting only when m ore than one
issue is to be determ ined by the corporate election.
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Super-majority voting rules have the rather undesirable characteristics of
being arbitrarily determ ined (e.g., why are 67 percent and 75 p ercent the
m ost common super-majority thresholds?) and may confer upon minority
shareholders unduly large levels of power. Furtherm ore, is it any more
reasonable to require a 67 percent majority to pursue a given activity (e.g., to
settle a given lawsuit out of court) than it is to require a 67 percent mzgorfty
to n o t pursue that activity? This issue may be of particular im portance to the
small firm which is likely to make a larger num ber o f decisions based on votes
am ong its shareholders.
We suggest here that voter power will be m ore closely aligned with
shareholdings in the elections of many small firms by employing a weighted
voting scheme, using either Shapley, Banzhaf, o r Owen Indices to weight or
reassign shareholder votes. To use the Shapley value scheme, we first note
that there are 120 = 5! voting perm utations and pivots. We then rearrange
the shareholders’ 99 votes such that their proportions of the 120 pivots are
as close as possible to their proportional shareholdings; that is, we reassign
votes so as to minimize g } Such a vote weighting scheme is defined here to
be optimal. U nder most circumstances, we will not be able to elim inate all
voting power discrepancies (or reduce o to zero) because each vote reassign
m ent affects the ability of each coalition or com bination to win. However, the
accuracy of our reassignments would be expected to improve if we had a
larger num ber of voters and potential pivots to rearrange. In our example,
the m inimum a is determ ined with a simulation based on equation (1), with
num erous possible combinations of votes held among investors. However,
each solution held in common the same winning combinations (coalitions

Table 5
Votes, Shapley Values (Si) and Squared Differences

i

Wi

fi

Si

s2

0.3666

0.000159
0.000388

A
B

35
30

0.354
0.303

C
D
E

20
13
1
99

0.202
0.131
0.010
1.00

Total

= 5 r /5 = 0.0002595.

a = 0.016109.
Note: 5|-= Total of

0.2833
0.2020
0.1166
0.0333
0.9998

0.000004
0.000207
0.000542
0.001301
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AB, AC, AD, BC and BDE) and the same num ber of pivots out of 120 for each
shareholder (A: 44, B: 34, C: 24, D: 14, E: 4). O ne of the optimal vote weighting
schemes is given in Table 5 such that shareholder A has 40.5 votes, B has 40
votes, C has 9.1 votes, D has 8.9 votes and E has 0.5 votes. If fractional votes
are n o t possible, vote assignments can be scaled. All of the other optimal
weighting schemes resulted in similar reassignments. The G resulting from
this assignm ent scheme is 0.0161, representing a significant im provem ent
over the G of 0.0836 for the one-share one-vote rule.
Unlike the num ber of “Shapley pivots”, the num ber of “Banzhaf swings”
is a function o f the num ber of votes outstanding as well as the num ber o f
shareholders. W hereas the original vote assignm ent resulted in 32 swings,
the optim al B anzhaf weighting schem e results in a total of 25 swings.
Shareholder A will have nine, B will have seven, C will have five, D will have
three and E will have one. T he num ber of votes in one of these optim al
schemes are given in Table 6. Again, o ther optim al B anzhaf weighting
schemes result in sim ilar vote reassignm ent levels. The G value is deter
m ined to be 0.0178, a significant im provem ent over the one-share, one
vote rule and approxim ately the same as the Shapley weighting schem e. If
we assume th a t all shareholders are equally likely to jo in all coalitions, the
Owen Index would result in vote reassignm ents identical to those of the
Banzhaf w eighting schemes. However, the Owen Index weighting schem e
would p erm it the flexibility to reassign votes based on varying likelihoods
of different coalition form ations.

Table 6
Votes, Banzhaf Values (Bi) and Squared Differences
i

Wi

35
30
20
13
1
99
= s t /5 = 0 . 000318 .
a = 0 . 0178325 .

A
B
C
D
E
Total

Note: S t = Total of

fi

0.354
0.303
0.202
0.131
0.010
1.00

Bi

0.36
0.28
0.20
0.12
0.04
1.00

52

0.000036
0.000529
0.000004
0.000121
0.000900
0.001590
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
It is no t clear which of the three weighting schemes here is best, though
m inim um a values provide some inform ation. No voting assignm ent scheme
may be regarded as being perfect. The Banzhaf Index has the advantage in
the corporate setting over the Shapley Indices in that it is based on equiprobable voting coalitions or combinations (perhaps generating many “swingers”
in a single winning coalition) rather than equiprobable voting perm utations
(orderings which will generate only one pivotal vote). This feature of the
Banzhaf index may seem m ore intuitively reasonable since it is quite possible
that m ore than one shareholder can influence results in a given election.
However, Banzhaf values may behave rather oddly or bear little relationship
to desirable characteristics of a power weighting scheme when the num ber
of voters is large (see Dubey 8c Shapley, 1978). Nonetheless, it does seem clear
from reductions in a that reassignm ent of shareholder voting rights by either
the Shapley, Banzhaf, or Owen weighting schemes of voting rights may
provide for a better alignm ent of shareholdings and relative power.

NOTES
1.

A minority discoimt is a deduction from the proportional net asset value intended to
reflect the shareholder’s less than proportional control in the firm. Such discounts are
frequently permitted by tax authorities in determining share values in estate sales, for
gift taxes, etc.

2.

O f course, we could even vary the number of votes outstanding in the 99 share firm such
that the we can establish a reassignment scheme such that the a value can be set equal
to zero.
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